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Abstract:	In what follows, I appeal to Charles Babbage’s discussion of the division of mental labor to provide evidence that—at least with respect to the social acquisition, storage, retrieval, and transmission of knowledge—epistemologists have, for a broad range of phenomena of crucial importance to actual knowers in their epistemic practices in everyday life, failed adequately to appreciate the significance of socially distributed cognition.  If the discussion here is successful, I will have demonstrated that a particular presumption widely held within the contemporary discussion of the epistemology of testimony—a presumption that I will term the personalist requirement—fails to account for those very practices of knowers that I detail here.  I will then conclude by suggesting that an alternate account of testimonial warrant, one that has heretofore been underappreciated, ought to be given more serious consideration—in particular in that it is particularly well suited to account for those actual practices of knowers that the personalist requirement leaves unrecognized.

1.	Contemporary Epistemology of Testimony and the Personalist Requirement
Virtually all contemporary discussions of testimony include some requirement to the effect that, in Jennifer Lackey’s formulation, “For every speaker A and hearer B, B knows that p on the basis of A’s testimony that p … only if … B is a reliable or properly functioning recipient of testimony.” (Lackey [2003], 716)  Call this requirement—for reasons that will become clear—the personalist requirement, or PR.  Lackey formulates the PR requirement as a necessary condition in the context of an account involving “minimal requirements” on testimonial knowledge, intended to stake out what will count as common ground between reductionists and non-reductionists.  The goal of this paper, however, is ultimately to suggest that even this “minimal requirement” is too strong.  If I succeed in demonstrating this, and to the extent that Lackey’s account indeed characterizes the common ground between non-reductionists and reductionists with respect to the epistemology of testimony,​[2]​ then I will, mutatis mutandis, have presented an argument against reductionist theories as well.​[3]​
Note that what is meant by PR is not—or not merely—that recipients of testimony reliably understand the communications of testifiers.  That is, the condition specified above is not exhausted simply by a recipient’s being a reliable or proper functioning speaker of the language in which the testifier issues her communication.  Rather, the point of requiring that believers of testimony can only be warranted if they are reliable recipients of testimony is to suggest that believers of testimony, if they are to be warranted in those testimonially-derived beliefs, must form those beliefs in part on the basis of their being sufficiently sensitive to the reliable truth connectedness of their interlocutors’ utterances.
In order to provide additional explication of the requirement that believers on the basis of testimony be a “reliable recipient” of testimony, it will be useful briefly to turn to Sanford Goldberg’s recent discussion of testimonial warrant, in Goldberg [2007].  There, Goldberg advances, as one of the conditions on testimonial warrant, that a recipient’s “acceptance of the testimony [must be] the upshot of a reliable capacity to distinguish reliable attestations from unreliable ones.” (Goldberg [2007], 3)  Indeed, it is this condition to which Goldberg later appeals in defending his form of reliabilist non-reductionism (or “anti-individualism,” as Goldberg prefers) against the charge of licensing gullibility: even those recipients of testimony who accept their interlocutors’ claims without adducing positive evidence in favor of that acceptance will, on Goldberg’s account, be required at a minimum to be sensitive to tell-tale signs of untrustworthiness on the part of their interlocutors. (Cf. Goldberg [2007], 166)
Given this, and to the extent that Lackey’s and Goldberg’s position on this point is shared by others within the literature, one of the minimal requirements for testimonial warrant is that recipients of testimony bear a certain burden to assess the reliability of their interlocutors—even if, as Goldberg suggests, they may meet this obligation through subconscious monitoring of the reliability of those interlocutors.​[4]​  There are two aspects of this position that are relevant for us here.  The first is that, regardless of how the individual is to meet this burden, it is a burden that, according to Lackey and Goldberg, the individual epistemic agent must meet solely through the employment of his or her epistemic resources.  The second is that what it is for the individual to be a reliable recipient of testimony involves being reliably sensitive to epistemically relevant properties of testifiers’ utterances.​[5]​
The first aspect, then, involves the idea that being a reliable recipient of testimony, in the sense suggested by Lackey and Goldberg, is a quality of those recipients, like being good at mathematical calculation, say, or being a good rhetorician.  And though, of course, the environment will have to be suitable for the exercise of that quality of the recipient, this way of thinking about the reception of testimony as an action of agents, one that can be performed more or less reliably, would allow us to understand the reception of testimony, like perception, memory, etc., as constituting a belief-forming process.​[6]​
The notion of belief-forming process adduced here is, of course, the one introduced by Goldman, where, by “process,” what is meant is “a functional operation or procedure, i.e., something that generates a mapping from certain states—‘inputs’—into other states—‘outputs’”—the outputs being, in the case under consideration here, beliefs of the agent. (Goldman [1979], 115)  What is significant for us here is that the reception of testimony, understood in the way that Lackey does, also satisfies Goldman’s stipulation that belief-forming processes involve “how a cognizer deals with his cognitive input, i.e., … the operations that register and transform … [by means of] ‘information-processing’ equipment internal to the organism … the stimulation that reaches him.” (Goldman [1979], 116)
The second aspect involves understanding the information to which reliable recipients of testimony are sensitive as itself concerning the properties of the utterances of individual testifiers that mark them as reliably truth connected.  One question with respect to this aspect concerns whether there are, e.g., properties of testifiers that are reliable indicators of their reliability and trustworthiness and, if so, whether recipients of testimony are, in fact, sensitive to those indicators.  I will not address that question here.​[7]​  The question with which I will be concerned here involves the fact that the properties to which recipients are supposed to be sensitive are properties of individual testifiers—e.g., their reasons for believing the content of what they’re testifying, their reasons for testifying, their standing with respect to the subject matter of what they’re testifying, etc.
Thus, the prevailing view in the epistemology of testimony—at least to the extent that the aspects of Lackey’s and Goldberg’s accounts discussed here are representative of shared presumptions within the current debate—is that testimonial warrant involves, at least in part, (a) the exercise of a capacity or sensitivity on the part of the recipient of testimony, a sensitivity to (b) epistemically relevant properties of the testimony. It is this view, that it is a necessary condition on testimonial warrant that the recipient exercise a capacity of testimonial reception involving a sensitivity to epistemically relevant properties of the testimony, that I have termed the personalist requirement.

2.	Babbage and Socially Distributed Cognitive Systems
In the previous section, I traced out the presence of the personalist requirement in the contemporary epistemology of testimony.  In this section and the next, I discuss instances of socially distributed cognition; ultimately, my suggestion will be that the existence of socially distributed cognitive systems provides us with reason to doubt both components of the personalist requirement—both that warranted recipients of testimony must exercise a capacity of testimonial reception and that in the exercise of that capacity recipients are sensitive to epistemically relevant properties of testifiers’ utterances. 

2.1.	Babbage on the Division of Mental Labor
Though the idea of socially distributed cognition has only gained attention in the last 20 years,​[8]​ Charles Babbage was in fact the first thinker to analyze socially distributed cognitive systems, in Chapter XIX of his 1832 work On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, “On the Division of Mental Labour.”  Indeed, it was Babbage’s consideration there of socially distributed cognitive systems—such as the socially distributed system for the computation of logarithmic and trigonometric tables developed by the M. de Prony for the government of France during the Napoleonic regime—that gave him the idea for development of tools for mechanical computation.​[9]​
As Babbage’s description of de Prony’s project makes clear, the computation of those mathematical tables—a project that extended to eighteen volumes and involved the work of almost 100 workers assigned to different tasks—involved a complex system of social organization designed specifically to achieve the most accurate tables of mathematical results known up to that time.​[10]​  Here is Babbage’s description of de Prony’s design:
First Section.—The duty of this first section was to investigate, amongst the various analytical expressions which could be found for the same function, that which was most readily adapted to simple numerical calculation by many individuals employed at the same time. This section had little or nothing to do with the actual numerical work. When its labours were concluded, the formulae on the use of which it had decided, were delivered to the second section.
Second Section.—This section consisted of seven or eight persons of considerable acquaintance with mathematics: and their duty was to convert into numbers the formulae put into their hands by the first section,—an operation of great labour; and then to deliver out these formulae to the members of the third section, and receive from them the finished calculations. The members of this second section had certain means of verifying these calculations without the necessity of repeating, or even of examining the whole of the work done by the third section.
Third Section.—The members of this section, whose number varied from sixty to eighty, received certain numbers from the second section, and, using nothing more than simple addition and subtraction, they returned to that section the finished tables. It is remarkable that nine-tenths of this class had no knowledge of arithmetic beyond its two first rules which they were thus called upon to exercise, and that these persons were usually found more correct in their calculations, than those who possessed a more extensive knowledge of the subject. (Babbage [1832], 156 – 157)
Babbage saw in de Prony’s achievement a model for the future of large-scale scientific endeavors, calling the resulting work “the most stupendous monument of arithmetical calculation which the world has yet produced.” (Babbage [1822])  Despite his own admiration for the achievement, however, Babbage recognized that the possibility of having achieved such a task employing only workers equipped with the most rudimentary arithmetical skills “may appear to non-mathematical readers to be rather too large a postulate,” one shrouded in “apparent mystery.” (Babbage [1832], 158)
Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that the unique properties of de Prony’s achievement, properties that Babbage discussed under the heading of the “division of mental labor,” went largely unrecognized for more than 150 years, until the rediscovery of the phenomenon of socially distributed cognition in the present day.  For the remainder of the discussion here, I will focus on two particular attributes of socially distributed cognitive systems, each of which will be of particular significance for our consideration of the viability of the personalist requirement.  First, the structure of socially distributed cognitive networks—and, in particular, the elements of that structure that are epistemically relevant—may be opaque to the individual participants in those networks.  Second, expertise can be a feature of the network as opposed to the individual participants in the networks. 

2.2.	Opacity of epistemically relevant properties in Socially Distributed Cognition
The first characteristic of socially distributed cognition pertains to the fact that the structure and properties of many of the processes involved in socially distributed cognition are inaccessible to the participants in those socially distributed cognitive networks.  I will refer to this as the opacity of epistemically relevant properties in socially distributed cognition.  There are at least two reasons why it is important that socially distributed cognitive processes are opaque in this way.
First, the opacity of epistemically relevant properties in socially distributed cognitive processes relieves participants within those processes of the additional cognitive burden of tracking the process itself.  One of the productive advantages of socially distributed cognitive networks is that it relieves individuals in those networks of additional responsibilities, allowing them to focus all of their energies on the specific information gathering duties with which they have been tasked, then it should be little wonder that socially distributed cognitive networks display such opacity.  Having to reflect upon the properties of the network would be an extraneous task for the members of the network—precisely the sort of task from which participants within the network ought to be freed.  Thus, recall that Babbage describes the members of the third section as having “received certain numbers from the second section, and, using nothing more than simple addition and subtraction, [returning] to that section the finished tables,” despite the fact “that nine-tenths of this class had no knowledge of arithmetic beyond its two first rules which they were thus called upon to exercise.”​[11]​
One way to design systems in which individual members of such socially distributed cognitive networks may be relieved of the responsibility of tracking the properties of the network itself is to reduce their tasks by focusing their attention on their interactions with the other members of the network with whom they are immediately connected and the tools of the trade on which they have been trained—i.e., to use Donald Norman’s term, the “things that make them smart.”  Babbage puts the point this way, in an extended analogy in which he compares de Prony to an industrialist—and de Prony’s algorithms, and the workers performing his calculations, to machines:  though Prony’s feat of social cognitive design 
requires the assistance of operative engineers capable of executing the [socially distributed cognitive] machinery he has designed, some of whom should understand the nature of the processes to be carried on … , when a sufficient number of machines [i.e., the translations of the algorithms formulated by the first section into the elementary sequence of calculations capable of being performed by the third section] have been made, a multitude of other persons, possessed of a lower degree of skill, must be employed in using them; these form the third section.” (Babbage [1832], 158)​[12]​
That is, the only responsibilities of each of the individual members of the network are local ones; no individual member of the network need be tasked with coordinating the operations of the network as a whole.
The second reason for the importance of the opacity of the epistemically relevant properties of socially distributed cognitive networks has to do with the fact that the skills required for the completion of the cognitive tasks that are the responsibilities of the individuals making up the network are likely very different than the skills that would be required to design, track, and assess socially distributed cognitive networks to perform the sorts of tasks that those networks perform.  
For example, the abilities required of the members of the three sections are each very different, as Babbage notes.  Indeed, this is the very point of the value of the division of mental labor: “the effect of the division of labour, both in mechanical and in mental processes, is, that it enables us to purchase and apply to each process precisely that quantity of skill and knowledge which is required for it.” (Babbage [1832], 162)  Furthermore, the abilities required for participating in any of the three sections is a very different ability again than the ability that de Prony exhibited in contriving the socially distributed cognitive system that he devised for producing the logarithmic tables—or indeed than the ability that Babbage demonstrates in assessing de Prony’s achievement.​[13]​  Indeed, as we will see later, there may in fact be no person who knows what properties of a particular socially distributed cognitive network are the ones that contribute to the success of the network.​[14]​

3.3.	Non-Locality of Expertise in Socially Distributed Cognition
The second characteristic of socially distributed cognition of relevance to our discussion involves the way in which, in such socially distributed cognitive networks, expertise can be a property of the network as opposed to the participants.  I will refer to this as the non-locality of expertise in socially distributed cognition.  As we saw, Babbage emphasizes that the vast majority of those involved in the computation of the logarithmic tables for de Prony were workers with only the most rudimentary arithmetic skills—and certainly lacking the ability to understand the significance of the role that they perform.  This feature of non-locality of expertise means that “[one] can embed a novice who has social skills but lacks computational skills in such a network and get useful behavior out of that novice and the system.”  (Hutchins [1995], 224)  This is due to the way that a given socially distributed cognitive network, composed of local networks of individuals interacting with their neighbors and the equipment designed to support workers in their completion of the tasks at hand, “may provide enough constraints to determine what turns out to be a well-organized computational behavior even though the behavior was not motivated by any understanding of the computation.  The task world is constructed in such a way that the socially and conversationally appropriate thing to do given the tools at hand is also the computationally correct thing to do.” (Hutchins [1995], 224)
In an extended passage worth quoting in its entirety, Hutchins discusses this feature of socially distributed cognitive networks as follows:
An important advantage of social distribution of computing is that novices can be embedded in social arrangements such that much of the structure required for them to organize their activity is available in the social relations.  Even though the skills have mainly social significance to the novices, they can learn a great many skills that have computational significance to the system. (Hutchins [1995], 227)
Thus, the non-locality of expertise in socially distributed cognitive systems is a function of the way in which the activities of non-experts can be constrained by elements of the system, making the actions of those novices yield computationally significant results, results about whose significance the novices themselves may be unaware.​[15]​ 
Thus, Babbage’s discussion of de Prony’s system for the production of logarithmic tables suggests that certain forms of social organization may be composed to perform cognitive tasks; I have referred to such forms of social organization as instances of socially distributed cognition.  Furthermore, Babbage’s discussion of the characteristics of the particular socially distributed cognitive system devised by de Prony led me to consider in particular two attributes of such systems:
(1)	Opacity of epistemically relevant properties in socially distributed cognition, and
(2)	Non-locality of expertise in socially distributed cognition.
In the following section, I will suggest that forms of socially distributed cognition are not limited to such highly structured environments as de Prony’s production of logarithmic tables as described by Babbage.  On the contrary, there would seem to be strong evidence that socially distributed cognitive systems are a widespread feature of contemporary life.

3.	A More General Consideration of Socially Distributed Cognition
The discussion of the previous section would suggest that there is good evidence to interpret de Prony’s use of teams of workers to calculate vast volumes of logarithmic tables as an example of a socially distributed cognitive system, exhibiting the properties of opacity and non-locality of expertise discussed above.  However, the question remains as to how widespread instances of socially distributed cognitive systems are.

3.1.	The Pervasiveness of Socially Distributed Cognitive Systems
Babbage, for one, would seem to have thought that many social groups tasked with accomplishing collective goals are instances of socially distributed cognitive systems.  For example, Babbage points to newspapers as a further form of socially distributed cognition:
The establishment of The Times newspaper is an example, on a large scale, of a manufactory in which the division of labour, both mental and bodily, is admirably illustrated, and in which also the effect of the domestic economy is well exemplified. It is scarcely imagined, by the thousands who read that paper in various quarters of the globe, what a scene of organized activity the factory presents during the whole night, or what a quantity of talent and mechanical skill is put in action for their amusement and information.” (Babbage [1832], 216)
Given the complexity of so many tasks undertaken by groups in contemporary industrialized societies, and given the advantages accruing to such systems on the basis of the properties of amplification of capacities and non-locality of expertise discussed in the previous section, it is perhaps unsurprising that so many of these tasks would be undertaken by socially distributed cognitive systems.  Indeed, Babbage suggests that the success of socially distributed labor in manufacturing provides proof for the applicability of socially distributed labor to cognitive processes—including the practice of science—as well: “The progress of knowledge convinced the world that the system of the division of labour and of cooperation was as applicable to science, as it had been found available for the improvement of manufactures.” (Babbage [1830], 40)
Nor is Babbage alone in this interpretation of the activities of social groups in the diverse fields of journalism, industrial manufacturing, business and government management, or large-scale science.  Thus, in their excellent 2000 work The Social Life of Information, Brown and Duguid observe:
It may at first seem that group practice and community support are only appropriate for the tedium of ‘lowly’ claims processing.  They might seem to have little to do with the ‘higher’ altitudes of knowledge work, where the image of the lone, Rodinesque ‘thinker’ is more common.  Yet the value of communities of practice to creating and sharing knowledge is as evident in the labs of particle physicists and biotechnologists as in the claims of the processing unit.  ... apprenticeship-like activity ... is found not only on the shop floor, but throughout the highest reaches of education and beyond.  In the last years of graduate school or in internships, scientists, humanists, doctors, architects, or lawyers, after years of schoolroom training, learn their craft in the company of professional mentors.  Here, they form learning communities capable of generating, sharing, and deploying highly esoteric knowledge. (Brown & Duguid [2000], 126-7)
As in Babbage’s discussion, Brown and Duguid suggest that the complexity of knowledge creation, sharing, and deployment tasks involved contemporary life favors the creation of socially distributed cognitive systems over the deployment of, in Brown and Duguid’s formulation, “lone, Rodinesque” thinkers.  
Readers, at this point, might well be willing to grant that such socially distributed cognitive systems exhibit the characteristics of irreducibility​[16]​ and amplification of capacities.​[17]​  Skepticism may yet linger, however, regarding the features of socially distributed cognitive systems most crucial to our argument here: opacity and non-locality of expertise.  For this reason, it will be useful to canvass more evidence establishing these characteristics with respect to socially distributed cognitive systems more generally.

3.2.	Evidence for Opacity in a Range of Socially Distributed Cognitive Systems
Like Babbage in discussing de Prony’s production of logarithmic tables, Brown and Duguid also emphasize the opacity of the epistemically relevant properties of many socially distributed cognitive processes.  I will consider three attributes of socially distributed cognitive systems which might explain this opacity, two of which are the analogues of the attributes that I discussed in connection with Babbage: the locality of tasks, obviating the necessity of group members to have an overview of the system as a whole; and the fact that the skills needed to complete those local tasks are not necessarily conducive to acquiring the skills needed to analyze the system as a whole.  
Before I move to a consideration of the three attributes I link to opacity, however, it will be useful briefly to note one of structural qualities of the organizations of which socially distributed cognitive systems are often components.  As Brown and Duguid remark, many of the goals assigned to groups within organizations are assigned to those groups by decision-makers outside of the group, decision-makers in positions of authority over the group within the larger organization of which the group is a part.  Brown and Duguid refer to the perspective of such decision-makers as being “cross-functional” and “longitudinal,” and contrast this perspective with the “lateral” ties that constitute the interactions among members of the groups.
This is the first reason for the opacity of epistemically relevant properties of socially distributed cognitive systems, an analogue of the first of the explanations for opacity I canvassed in the discussion of Babbage—i.e., the embeddedness of individual tasks in local interactions.  For such lateral ties promote opacity by hiding the way in which information is transferred among members of the group.  Brown and Duguid suggest that these lateral ties result in an inextricable linkage between the information contained within the group and the social practices by which the group maintains its cohesiveness:
... the talk and the work, the communication and the practice are inseparable.  The talk [makes] the work intelligible, and the work [makes] the talk intelligible.  As part of this common work-and-talk, creating, learning, sharing, and using knowledge appear almost indivisible.  Conversely, talk without the work, communication without practice is if not unintelligible, at least unusable.  Become a member of a community, engage in its practices, and you can acquire and make use of its knowledge and information.  Remain an outsider, and these will remain indigestible. (Brown & Duguid [2000], 125-6)
That is, rather than transmitting information through explicit instruction, members of the group learn by telling and re-telling stories, by maintaining their social ties to the other members of the group, by unconscious imitation.  Thus, Brown and Duguid suggest that “office design can produce powerful learning environments,” but that “much of that power comes from incidental learning.  For example, people often find what they need to know by virtue of where they sit and who they see rather than by direct communication.” (Brown & Duguid [2000], 72)​[18]​  Brown and Duguid speak of this quality of socially distributive cognition in terms of embeddedness. 
The ways in which information-transfer within socially distributed cognitive systems are embedded within the social practices of those systems, however, means that the significance of such practices is often hidden from members of the groups in which those systems are instantiated.  Thus, Miyake [1986] noted that, when questioned individually, the members of two-person teams who had engaged in an hour-long joint comprehension activity and had reported having a subjective feeling of complete sharing, gave very different explanations for the procedures governing the activities with which they were tasked.​[19]​  Of course, complex tasks are often the domain of socially distributed cognitive systems involving many more than merely two individuals.  Given this fact, the opacity of the epistemically relevant attributes of such systems will likely be even greater than that reported by Miyake. 
A further reason for the opacity of epistemically relevant aspects of socially distributed cognition—one not discussed in connection with Babbage—involves the way in which such socially distributed cognitive systems evolve.  Thus, Norman notes that, 
… over years of experience, the procedure for performing these tasks have gone through a process of natural evolution from their original form to their current shape.  Over time, a long sequence of minor changes would occur, each modifying procedures in a small way.  Changes that were effective would be apt to stay, changes that were detrimental would be apt to die away.  This is a process of natural evolution, and it can lead to remarkably efficient results, even if nobody is in charge, even if nobody is aware of the process. (Norman [1993], 144-5)
The fact that socially distributed cognitive systems develop by means of an evolutionary process in order better to accomplish specific tasks does not only provide an explanation as to how it is that such systems could develop without the conscious control of any single individual.  Given that the time-frame for such evolution will often exceed that of the service life of any of the individual members of the social group, many members of the group will have cycled in and out of the group over the course of the development of a given socially distributed cognitive network.  This means that current members of the group will likely lack the historical perspective on the development of current practices necessary to provide an explanation for why things are done the way they are within the group.
I have canvassed two reasons for the opacity of epistemically relevant properties of socially distributed cognitive networks: the embeddedness of information within social relations and the evolutionary nature of the development of the processes by which such networks accomplish cognitive tasks.  Brown and Duguid note one more reason for the opacity of socially distributed cognitive networks, a reason stemming from the structure of the organizations of which such systems are often parts.  Recall that Brown and Duguid contrast the “longitudinal” perspective of decision-makers to whom work groups report with the “lateral” perspective of the members within those groups.  Given the requirement that work groups report on their activities to decision makers, the very activity of describing the activity of the group in the language of the longitudinal perspective of those decision makers can distort the understanding of those activities—not only on the part of the decision makers, but also on the part of the very members of the group themselves.
Thus, Brown and Duguid suggest that the longitudinal, process-oriented description of the activity of a group—the production of which they term “processing”—provides a further, third, source of opacity:
In all walks of life, processing provides a screen between what people do and what people say they do.  It helps turn unauthorized practice, however effective, into authorized routine, however inept.  It makes us all appear ‘rational’ and rule governed to the world, even though a great deal of what everyone does is, of necessity, guesswork and intuition.  Most people, indeed, are not even aware of the implicit improvisation they engage in to bridge the gap between these two.  They simply assume that what they do and what their job description says are one and the same.  People thus keep their own skills hidden even from themselves.  (Even braggarts usually brag about the wrong things.) (Brown & Duguid [2000], 110)
That is, the ways in which I assess and explain our own performance within the socially distributed cognitive systems of which we are a part to outsiders—and to ourselves as well—demonstrates that we are often unaware of the significance of the tasks that we perform and the skills that we possess.  Thus, our own attempts to process our activities show at least some of the ways in which the epistemically relevant aspects of our roles in socially distributed cognitive activities are opaque, even to ourselves.  This is the analogue of the second of the explanations for opacity we discussed in connection with Babbage—viz., that the skills that the members of the group exercise in the performance of their tasks are not the skills that they would need to possess, let alone exercise, in order to analyze the system of which they are parts.
Note that the opacity of the epistemically relevant aspects of socially distributed cognition holds for socially distributed cognitive systems within large-scale scientific research as well.  Thus, Knorr Cetina, in her examination of large-scale science in molecular biology and high energy physics, systems she terms “object-oriented,” to contrast with “group-oriented” political or bureaucratic organizations, notes:
Weber indeed stated that bureaucracy is ‘essentially control by means of knowledge’ (1947: 335, 337).  Yet as Parsons pointed out upon the translation of Weber’s work into English (1947: 59), technical competence and the legal competence Weber emphasized in bureaucracy call for different kinds of organization, a problem Weber ignored by lumping the two together and never really following up on the technical side.  Also, the idea of competence locates all there is to say about the object-world in the person.  What interests me is, for example, how the object-world is allowed to structure organizing formats, how it is represented and preserved in these formats, and how object-oriented schemes replace group-oriented schemes or … hierarchical means of control as in bureaucratic organizations … (Knorr Cetina [1999], 293)
As we have seen so far, however, just as Knorr Cetina is right to suggest that the legal expertise called upon to structure bureaucratic organizations is distinct from the sort of technical competence exhibited by participants in large-scale science, so is such technical competence distinct from the sociological or psychological competence that would be necessary for participants within the socially distributed cognitive networks in large-scale science adequately to assess the epistemically relevant properties of such networks.  Since there is no reason to suppose that participants in those networks have the relevant sociological or psychological competences, then, it is little wonder that the epistemically relevant properties of those socially distributed cognitive networks would be opaque to those participants—regardless of the high level of sophisticated training they might possess within their own fields.

3.3.	Evidence for Non-Locality of Expertise in a Range of Socially Distributed Cognitive Systems
Thus, many social groups charged with cognitive tasks exhibit opacity—the members of those groups are often unaware of the epistemically relevant properties that those groups possess.  There is further evidence that such groups also exhibit the property that I dubbed non-locality of expertise—that is, that even novices can be deployed in the group activity and, merely by performing the socially appropriate action, can thereby perform an action that, from the perspective of the group information-processing task, is significant for the completion of the cognitive task at hand.
We already saw evidence for this point in the case of de Prony discussed in Babbage [1832].  More generally, the prevalence of machine-aided cognitive tasks in contemporary life should underscore the ways in which the environment can relieve humans of mnemonic and other cognitive burdens.  Thus, as Norman [1993] notes, “when the intellect is tightly coupled to the world, decision making and action can take place within the context established by the physical environment, where the structures can often act as a distributed intelligence, taking some of the memory and computational burden off the human.” (Norman [1993], 146-7)​[20]​
The non-locality of expertise within socially distributed cognitive systems would seem to be an immediate result of the way in which socially distributed cognitive systems off-load tasks from individuals and onto specially designed equipment or organizational features of the system itself.  For further evidence of the way in which the evolution of socially distributed cognitive systems leads to increasingly more finely drawn divisions of labor within the task, thus decreasing the cognitive demands on each of the individuals within those systems and taking advantage of the features of the cognitive system itself to create expertise, one need look no further than the intricate processes involved in the large-scale research involved in high-energy particle physics.  Knorr Cetina recounts that
Even a data run, originally a nightmare for the experts in the control room -- with alarms sounding, detectors tripping, data acquisition systems overflowing, and countless monitoring tasks continually producing countless complaints -- has become a manageable succession of steps.  Data runs can now be handled even by newcomers, once all the major ‘bugs’ have been eliminated, safeguards have been implemented, and partial tasks automated. (Knorr Cetina [1999], 130)
Indeed, the ways in which tasks are portioned out among group members so as to reduce the complexity and computational demands required for the completion of those tasks are also underscored by the increased mechanization of those tasks, even within large-scale science.​[21]​

4.	The Significance of Socially Distributed Cognition for the Personalist requirement
Thus, I have now adduced a great deal of evidence to support the claim that there are socially distributed cognitive systems, characterized by the properties of 
1.	Opacity of epistemically relevant properties, and
2.	Non-locality of expertise.
In this section I will assess the implications of these characteristics of socially distributed cognitive systems for the personalist requirement that I isolated as a feature of many of the contemporary theories of testimonial warrant.  Before I turn, however, to a consideration of how it is that the characteristics (1) & (2) of socially distributed cognitive systems bear on the personalist requirement, it will be important briefly to consider whether beliefs formed on the basis of information acquired by interaction with (members of) a socially distributed cognitive system count as testimonially warranted.

4.1	Socially Distributed Cognitive Systems as Sources of Warrant
There can be, it seems, little question as to whether beliefs formed on the basis of information acquired by interaction with (members of) a socially distributed cognitive system ought to be considered warranted.  As we saw in the discussion of the previous section, such systems are so pervasive that, were we to reject the idea that information derived from the activity of socially distributed cognition counts as warranted, there would be little that we could count as being warranted in believing.  Indeed, though I will not pursue this line of discussion here, there is a great deal of motivation for arguing by analogy that even larger systems within contemporary society—television news, the dissemination of scientific information in the popular press, Wikipedia, to name a few prominent examples—might also profitably be understood as instances of massively distributed social cognition.
Note that our suggestion that one may acquire warrant via interaction with socially distributed cognitive systems holds for two sorts of recipients of information from those groups.  First, outsiders—e.g., bosses receiving reports on the activity of a team like the ones discussed by Brown and Duguid, other scientists reading a report by a research team engaged in large-scale scientific research of the sort discussed by Knorr Cetina, or safety inspectors reviewing the reports of nuclear power plant engineers considered by Perrow—can be warranted in believing the information they acquire by communicating with those groups.  Second, members of socially distributed cognitive systems “downstream” from other information processors within the group can also be warranted in believing the information produced “upstream” from them within the group.  Evidence for this may be found in Babbage’s discussion of the work of John Pond, the sixth Astronomer Royal.  In an 1826 letter, quoted by Babbage, Pond emphasizes his reliance on the measurements and calculations performed by the “indefatigable, hard-working, and above all, obedient drudges (for so I must call them, although they are drudges of a superior order), men who will be contented to pass half their day in using their hands and eyes in the mechanical act of observing, and the remainder of it in the dull process of calculation.” (Pond, quoted in Babbage [1830],  126 fn.)
Recall that, in section 1, I characterized the personalist requirement as involving the claim that testimonial warrant involves, at least in part, (a) the exercise of a capacity or sensitivity on the part of the recipient of testimony, a sensitivity to (b) properties of the testimony.  If one can acquire testimonial warrant by means of communication with socially distributed cognitive systems, however, then the characteristics of those systems that I adduced in the previous sections may be relevant to the personalist claim that, in order to be warranted, recipients of testimony must be reliable recipients of testimony, where the notion of being a reliable recipient is understood to involve sensitivity to the qualities of testifiers that might bear on their reliability, say, or their honesty. I will first consider the question of (b) whether it is qualities of the testimony to which recipients of testimony must be sensitive, before turning to the question of (a) whether warrant ought to be understood to require—to recall a formulation of Goldberg’s—“a reliable capacity to distinguish reliable attestations from unreliable ones.” (Goldberg [2007], 3)

4.2	Non-locality of Expertise and the Second Personalist Condition
With respect to the question of whether it is an individual testifier’s qualities upon which a recipient’s warrant depends, the relevant characteristic of socially distributed cognition would seem to be the non-locality of expertise in socially distributed cognitive systems.  Given the non-locality of expertise, however, it should be clear that it is not solely the qualities of individual testifiers that are of relevance to a recipients’ acquiring warrant from that testifier’s communication of information derived from the functioning of the socially distributed cognitive system.  Rather, it is also the properties of the system as a whole that are relevant to the recipient’s warrant on the basis of that communication.
Consider, e.g., Knorr Cetina’s suggestion that, in the large-scale physics experiments at CERN, “data runs can … be handled even by newcomers, once all the major ‘bugs’ have been eliminated, safeguards have been implemented, and partial tasks automated.”  If one acquires information from communication with a newcomer, it will not be the newcomer’s lack of expertise that is relevant to one’s warrant; rather one’s warrant stems from the reliable truth-conducivity of structured tasks that the newcomer performs in order to acquire that information.  Note furthermore that the members of the CERN team who eliminated “bugs,” implemented safeguards, and automated tasks will likely no longer be members of the team; there may well be no member of the team who even remembers exactly who performed those tasks—or even, in particular, what those individual tasks were or how they contributed to making the data runs go more smoothly.​[22]​  (Indeed, who is responsible for the sorts of facilitative tasks that make the implementation of a new technology possible is seldom recorded.)
Similarly, Hutchins notes that, “even though [a group member’s] behavior was not motivated by any understanding of the computation [the] task world is constructed in such a way that the socially and conversationally appropriate thing to do given the tools at hand is also the computationally correct thing to do.”  Given this, it should be clear that the properties relevant for a testimonial recipient’s warrant are not solely the properties of the individual group member with whom one happens to communicate, but rather also those of the group itself, the way in which “the task world is constructed [so that the group member’s action is] the computationally correct thing to do.”  If this is the case, however, then component (b) of the personalist requirement is false: it is not solely the properties of individual testifiers that are relevant to a recipient’s acquisition of testimonial warrant on the basis of communication with that testifier.

4.3	Opacity, Unique Vulnerability and the First Personalist Condition
Nor does the other component of the personalist requirement—the requirement (a) that recipients of testimony have a reliable discriminative capacity with respect to the reliability of the source of that testimony—fare any better, considering our discussion of the opacity of epistemically relevant properties of socially distributed cognitive systems (cf. sections 2.2 and 3.2).
Indeed, that the epistemically relevant properties of socially distributed cognitive systems are opaque is linked to the non-locality of expertise as well; that expertise in such systems is non-local means that the reason why the information produced by such systems is reliably linked to the truth lies to a large extent in the global, structural properties of the system itself.  This fact however, is itself related to the first reason that I adduced for the opacity of socially distributed cognition—viz., that the embeddedness of group participants into their local structures means that there is no reason for them to track the properties of the system as a whole and often no perspective available for them, from within their position within the system, to survey that system even if they wished to do so.  
The second source of opacity—viz., that the processes employed by socially distributed cognitive systems evolve over time—further buttresses the claim that group participants lack access to the epistemically relevant properties of the group processes.  Given that members of such cognitive systems rotate in and out of those systems, making decisions that effect the evolution of the processes employed by the system for reasons that are lost from the group’s memory when the members rotate out of the group, it would only take a few cycles of evolution for the reasons underlying the current state of the processes making up the socially distributed cognitive system to be inaccessible to its current members.
This inaccessibility of the epistemically relevant features of socially distributed cognitive processes is only further underscored by the third reason I adduced for opacity, the lack of the skills appropriate for the analysis of such processes on the part of those on whom the personalist requirement places the burden of analyzing those processes.  Recipients of testimony from such systems are seldom social or operational psychologists, sociologists, or cognitive anthropologists, and thus would be ill equipped to assess the properties of the systems from which they acquire information.  Indeed, given that even psychologists, sociologists, and cognitive anthropologists have only recently begun rigorously to analyze the properties of socially distributed cognitive systems that contribute to their success, it is not clear that anyone yet has a well-worked-out account of which features of socially distributed cognitive systems are conducive to the acquisition, reliable storage, assessment, and transmission of truths.
Given all of this evidence, there is strong reason for thinking that the properties of socially distributed cognitive systems that contribute to the success of those systems are inaccessible to those who interact with those systems—both participants within the system and outsiders.  Given the overwhelming evidence of the opacity of the epistemically relevant properties of socially distributed cognitive systems, it should be clear that recipients of testimony from such systems cannot be reliable at discriminating whether the reports issued by such systems are reliably truth-connected.  
Of course, one might immediately respond to this claim by noting that one could be knowledgeable about a system’s track-record without being able to isolate the properties of that system that conduce to its having the track record that it does.  However, there is little reason to believe that either participants within those systems or outsiders who receive information from the system actually assess track records of such systems.
In the case of participants within the system, this ought to be immediately obvious.  Since participants often do not know the computational significance of their performances to begin with, it would be odd to expect them to know adequately how to assess track records in the first place.  What participants within the system know how to do is to manipulate and move information in the way in which they had been trained; theirs is not to reason about whether the data they receive from further “upstream” is reliably produced. 
In the case of outsiders who receive information from socially distributed cognitive systems, whether those outsiders will have reason to assess the track records of such systems will depend on their relation to the systems themselves.  Thus, other workers in an organization of which the socially distributed cognitive system is a part may themselves have little reason to assess the track records of those systems; communicating with those systems and relying on the information they supply might well be what has always been done in the organization of which both communicants are parts.  In other cases, non-truth-related factors are often dispositive with respect to whether outsiders accept the communications of the socially distributed cognitive system without assessing its track record. 

5.	Reliability, Process Individuation and the Personalist requirement
The outlook for the personalist requirement, then, is bleak.  The fact that expertise is distributed within socially distributed cognitive systems tells against the idea that (b) it is the properties of individual testifiers that are relevant to the acquisition of warrant by recipients of testimony, while both opacity and unique vulnerability speak against the suggestion that (a) recipients of testimony can reasonably be expected to reliably discriminate between reliable and unreliable sources of testimony.
If the arguments presented so far are correct, then, to the extent that we must conceive of the processes involved in the testimonial acquisition of information in terms of the cognitive processes of individuals, there will be no way to understand those processes to be reliable in a wide range of social information-acquisition processes.  If we are to understand information acquisition from socially distributed cognitive systems as a species of warranted belief, however, we must be able to understand it as being produced by a reliable belief-forming process.  As we saw in section 1, though, the standard notion of a process in epistemology is itself personalist, involving, in Goldman’s formulation, “how a cognizer deals with his cognitive input, i.e., … the operations that register and transform … [by means of] ‘information-processing’ equipment internal to the organism … the stimulation that reaches him.” (Goldman [1979], 116)  What is needed is an alternate notion of process, one that encompasses—pace Goldman—socially distributed cognitive processes.​[23]​
Indeed, Goldberg himself came close to recognizing the need for embracing the possibility of epistemically relevant socially distributed processes.  In considering the fact that very young children acquire knowledge by means of testimony, Goldberg suggests that the only way to accommodate this fact is to accept
(AI-P) The process that eventuates in young children’s consumption of testimony (and hence the child’s testimonial belief) extends to include aspects of the child’s social environment—in particular, the coherence-monitoring that is performed for her by her adult guardians. (Goldberg [2007], 234)
That is, Goldberg recognizes the possibility that testimony might sometimes involve reliable belief-producing processes that are genuinely social, extending beyond the cognitive resources of the believer himself—albeit in a case limited to young children and with the concession that he himself finds his result counterintuitive.
Unfortunately, Goldberg was prevented from embracing the possibility of genuinely social belief-producing processes in full generality due to his continued commitment to the personalist requirement.  Thus, note the role that the adult guardians play in AI-P above.  The coherence-monitoring performed by the child’s adult guardians ensures that AI-P still complies with the personalist requirement: the guardians must (a) be reliable discriminators of reliable testimony, assessing the (b) individual testifiers with whom the children may interact.​[24]​  Thus, Goldberg’s AI-P is still a form of the epistemology of testimony that is committed to the personalist requirement, though in a deferred form.
What the consideration of socially distributed cognition demonstrates is that the epistemology of testimony requires an even more general way of countenancing genuinely social belief-forming processes.  It is perhaps surprising that such a formulation is immediately available—viz., the standard reliabilist account, with one modification.  This would be a modest social epistemology,​[25]​ allowing that:
(1)	Individuals are the primary bearers of knowledge.
(2)	Some individual S knows that p iff
a.	p
b.	S believes that p, and
c.	S’s belief that p was produced by a process that reliably produces true beliefs, where
(3)	Such processes may include the properties and actions of agents other than S as well as properties of the environment (i.e., instruments, etc.).
Thus, modest social epistemology can deploy a standard reliabilist account of knowledge, requiring only that the notion of process be broadened to include genuinely social belief-forming processes.
It is worthwhile to note, at least in passing, that one advantage of modest social epistemology is that it allows us to achieve an Aufhebung of the thesis/synthesis of reductionism and non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony.  Against the reductionist, modest social epistemology allows for the possibility that some testimonial processes that reliably produce true beliefs might not involve the requirement that recipients of testimony adduce positive reasons for trusting testimony.  Indeed, at least if structured in appropriate ways and situated in suitable environments, socially distributed cognitive systems would seem to offer examples of such processes.  Against the non-reductionist, on the other hand, modest social epistemology also allows for the possibility that, in some environments, the only way for subjects to acquire knowledge on the basis of testimony is to be able reliably to adduce sufficient positive reasons for accepting that testimony.  In a souq, even an “ugly American” with no awareness of defeaters for his belief would hardly be behaving well if he took on face value the testimony of a shopkeeper that the first price quoted was also the best price available.

6.  Conclusion
Contemporary life—in the industrialized world, at least—requires of citizens that they participate in a wide range of group activities, many of which have a socially-distributed information-gathering, information-storing, or information–processing component.  As I have argued here, such instances of socially-distributed cognition pose a challenge to those who seek to understand the information that individuals acquire from their participation in those group activities as instances of knowledge.  Given this, I have suggested that one attractive, and heretofore neglected, way to account for knowledge-acquisition by means of socially-distributed cognition is a version of reliabilism that allows that irreducibly social processes might nevertheless be understood as constituting belief-forming processes for the individuals within such social groups.  Indeed, to the extent that one finds it plausible to include a reliability requirement for testimonial knowledge, this form of social reliabilism—which I termed modest social epistemology—seems uniquely well-positioned to explain the significance of socially distributed cognition for the epistemology of testimony.
Despite—or perhaps because of—the beguiling simplicity of modest social epistemology, the view has, up to now, attracted few adherents in the contemporary discussion of the epistemology of testimony.  Having subjected to empirical test some of the more ambitious, apriorist attempts to formulate an epistemology of testimony, however, and having found them wanting, perhaps it is high time to consider more seriously some long overdue lessons from Babbage and to recognize the power and the fruitfulness of socially distributed cognitive approaches.
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^1	  Many thanks to Alvin Goldman, Sandy Goldberg, Thomas Grundmann, participants at the 2009 Cologne Summer School on the work of Alvin Goldman, and participants at the November 2010 meeting of the Greater Philadelphia Works in Progress in Epistemology group for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
^2	  Of course, some apriorist non-reductionists—most notably among them, perhaps, Burge [1993]—explicitly reject reliability as a condition for testimonial warrant.  However, to the extent that such non-reductionists conceive of testimony as a route by means of which epistemic license is preserved in the transmission between rational agents, such non-reductionists will also be subject to the criticisms of personalism presented below.  For, if the arguments presented here are correct, there are forms of group information acquisition—to which I refer as socially distributed cognition—in which the rational connections between beliefs and the evidence that supports them are functions of the relations among the members of the group, as opposed to simply being the result of an operation that preserves warrant in its transmission from one rational agent to another.
^3	  For another account that requires at least Lackey’s minimal conditions for testimonial justification, see, e.g., E. Fricker [1987], 61: “the subject’s belief must be causally dependent on his belief in (or some kind of sub-doxastic registering of) propositions which in fact constitute the premisses of a justification of his belief—which, if articulated, would constitute a good argument for it.”  For other accounts sharing those minimum requirements, see also M. Fricker [1998], particularly pg. 163; P. Faulkner [2000], particularly pp. 599 – 600; E. Craig [1990], Chapter V; and the discussion of the “assurance theorists”—such as A. Ross and R. Moran—in Owens [2006], particularly pp. 115 – 19.
^4	  On this, see the discussion in Goldberg [2007], Chap. 6.
^5	  That it is testifiers’ utterances to which recipients are to be sensitive is evident from Lackey [2006], in which Lackey suggests that it is the reliability of a testifier’s words, as opposed to the reliability of the testifier herself, that is relevant to the question of whether recipients of testimony acquire knowledge.
^6	  Note that this further claim—that we can identify a process, in the epistemologically relevant sense, of testimonial reception located in the person—would not be true of Goldberg.  The reason for this stems, at least in part, from Goldberg’s consideration of the epistemic warrant that young children enjoy for the beliefs they form on the basis of testimony, a consideration that leads him to suggest that features of the child’s environment must figure in the characterization of the epistemically-relevant belief-forming process that leads to the child’s belief.  I will consider this point further in section 5, below.
^7	  For this discussion, see Shieber [forthcoming].
^8	  The contemporary locus classicus for this discussion is undoubtedly Hutchins [1995].
^9	  As Swade notes, “Babbage had almost certainly seen the tables during a visit to Paris [prior to his development of a calculating machine], and estimated that one table of logarithms alone contained eight million figures.” (Swade [2000], 33)
^10	  Indeed, the inaccuracy of mathematical tables was the source of significant uncertainty—not to mention financial liability—in the first half of the 19th century.  As an example of this, Babbage notes that “it was discovered by government that the terms on which annuities had been granted by them were erroneous, and new tables were introduced by act of Parliament. It was stated at the time that the erroneous tables had caused a loss to the country of between two and three millions sterling. The fact of the sale of those annuities being a losing concern was long known to many; and the government appear to have been the last to be informed on the subject. Half the interest of half that loss, judiciously applied to the encouragement of mathematical science, would, in a few years, have rendered utterly impossible such expensive errors.” (Babbage [1830], 25)
^11	  Compare Hutchins, who explicitly identifies one of the strengths of socially distributed cognitive processes as involving the possibility, in such processes, “for the team to organize its behavior in an appropriate sequence without there being a global script or plan anywhere in the system.  Each crew member only needs to know what to do when certain conditions are produced in the environment.” (Hutchins [1995], 199)
^12	  Cf. Hutchins: “Each participant knows how to coordinate his activities with the technologies and persons he interacts with.  ... The whole cycle is something that emerges from the interactions of the individuals with one another and with the tools of the space.  The structure of the activities of the group is determined by a set of local computations rather than by the implementation of a global plan.  ... When the nature of the problem is seen as coordination among persons and devices, much of the organization of behavior is removed from the performer and is given over to the structure of the object or system with which one is coordinating.” (Hutchins [1995], 200)
^13	  As Hutchins notes, “[T]he mapping from individual performance to the group configuration is a nontrivial one.  Opportunities exist in the distributed version of the task that are simply not present in the solo-performance case.  Finding and exploiting these opportunities may require reflection on explicit representations of the work itself, and the members of the [socially distributed cognitive system] are ill equipped to do such reflection.” (Hutchins [1995], 228) 
^14	  Cf. Hölldobler & Wilson’s description of distributed cognition in social insects as involving cases in which “nothing in the brain of a worker ... represents a blueprint of the social order.  There is no overseer or ‘brain caste’ who carries such a master plan in its head.” (Hölldobler & Wilson [2009], 7)
^15	  Cf. Hölldobler & Wilson [2009], pg. 7: “... specialists, working together as a functional unit, are guided by sets of behavioral rules that operate in the following manner.  If in a given context the worker encounters a certain stimulus, it predictably performs one act, and if the same stimulus is received in a different context, the worker performs a different act. ... The totality of these relatively sparse and simple responses defines the social behavior of the [group].”
^16	  Compare Ilgen et al. [2005], 519: “Conceptually, team researchers have converged on a view of teams as complex, adaptive, dynamic systems (McGrath et al. [2000]).”
^17	  Cf., e.g., Hinsz et al. [1997], 50:  “Researchers have consistently found groups to be more reliable than individuals because there is less variability in their judgments (Einhorn, Hogarth, & Klempner, [1977]). Moreover, the research we have cited … suggests that groups also increase reliability in terms of the specific processes (i.e., rules and strategies) they use with the information. That is, groups are likely to use a specific process with the information to make a judgment more consistently, compared with individuals acting alone.”
^18	  As, e.g., Kraut, Egido & Galegher [1988] have demonstrated in their study of the effect of proximity on scientific collaboration, mere proximity alone is an extremely significant factor in communication and information acquisition.  Furthermore, as the classic discussions in Asch [1951], [1952], [1956] demonstrated more than half a century ago, social conformity is a significant and arational vector for belief-formation; more recently, the discussion in Chartrand & Bargh [1999] has suggested that the explanation for imitation is not so much that it serves a purpose in transmitting information or otherwise valuable skills, but rather that it serves to facilitate social interaction.
^19	  Furthermore, as Mesmer-Magus et al. [2009] noted, participants in teams—when attempting to communicate about ways to achieve optimal efficiency—only seldom share information that would actually improve group performance.  Compare Ilgen et al. [2005], 534: “Left to their own devices, most teams fail to learn the optimal schemes for integrating diverse opinions (Humphrey et al. [2002]).”  See also Norman [1993], 145: “The problem is, it isn’t always obvious just which parts are critical to the social, distributed nature of the task, which are irrelevant or detrimental.”
^20	  Cf. Clark & Chalmers [1998] and Clark [1998].  For an overview of recent empirical investigations suggesting that the non-locality of expertise—in the diverse areas of aviation, aeronautics, product manufacturing, and medical and critical care—can improve efficiency and quality of outcomes, see the discussion in Hales & Pronovost [2006].  The particular employment of even the simplest forms of distributed cognition—e.g., checklists—has received special attention recently for its role in improving surgical outcomes; for instance, in the widely-publicized study described in Haynes et al. [2009].
^21	  On this point, see the recent discussions in Waltz & Buchanan [2009] and King et al. [2009].
^22	  For a case study bearing on this point, see, e.g., Orlikowski et al. [1995].
^23	  Alston has criticized Goldman on the grounds that even the, for Goldman, paradigmatic processes of perception and inference cannot be walled off from the social: “To repeat the main point, the mere fact that learned concepts are involved in any belief formation, and that concept acquisition invariably involves socialization, is enough to show that even perceptual and simple inferential belief formation have a social aspect.” (Alston [1994], 31)
^24	  Cf. Goldberg [2007], p. 238: “adult caretakers play an active role in the process eventuating in the child’s acquisition of a testimonial belief, for example, by monitoring testimony profferred in their joint presence.”
^25	  Cf. Kitcher’s formulation of a “minimal social epistemology” in Kitcher [1994], 113.  There are two crucial differences between Kitcher’s account and the one suggested here.  The first is that Kitcher’s condition (3) relegates the importance of the properties and actions of agents to features of the environment in which the process that produces a subject’s belief functions.  The second is that, as Kitcher’s discussion in his [1993] would suggest, Kitcher is reluctant to abandon the idea that individual agents do track the reliability of their interlocutors; in his [1993], Kitcher countenances social factors in knowledge acquisition far enough to allow that a community of subjects, each of whose primary motivation is not the acquisition of truth, could nevertheless successfully track the truth.
